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RECENT DECISIONS
the company would not be liable for any damage sustained by the
driver's spouse on a direct action.43 The authorities would also seem
to cover the case of indirect suit through the spouse's son.44
Although the principal case is a novel and interesting one, it
seems that its effect on the law will not be lasting. By the simple
expedient of amending the co-operation clause to include co-operation
in third-party practice, insurers can remedy the problem raised by this
case. There is little doubt that they will do just that.
M
INSURANCE - SECTION 167(3) OF INSURANCE LAW - HELD
APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENTS IN OTHER JURIsDIcTIONS. - Plaintiff-
insurer issued, in New York, a liability policy to defendant's wife on
her automobile. Defendant is suing his wife in Connecticut for in-
juries received from the wife's negligent operation of the vehicle.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment denying liability on the ground
that the policy did not expressly insure the wife against the husband's
suit as required by Section 167(3) of the Ndw York Insurance Law.
The appellate division in reversing the judgment for the defendant
held that the requirements of Section 167(3) also applied to accidents
occurring outside the jurisdiction, thereby relieving the plaintiff of
all liability. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 1 A.D.2d 629,
152 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1st Dep't 1956).*
At common law, New York courts did not recognize a personal
injury action by one spouse against the other,' even though the injury
occurred in a jurisdiction which granted the right to maintain such
action.2  The tort was recognized; but the married parties were con-
43 "No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of
an insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse or because of
injury to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse unless express pro-
vision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy." N.Y. Iqs. LAw§ 167(3). See Feinman v. Bernard Rice Sons, Inc., 133 N.Y.S.2d 639, aff'd,
285 App. Div. 926, 139 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st Dep't 1955); Katz v. Wessel, 207
Misc. 456, 139 N.Y.S2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
44 This would follow from the strict construction given the statute by the
courts. See, e.g., Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 258' App. Div.
603, 605, 17 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1940) ; Peka, Inc. v. Kaye, 208 Misc. 1003,
145 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1955), reVd on other grounds, 1 A.D.2d 879, 150
N.Y.S.2d 774 (1st Dep't 1956); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Newman, 47 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 268 App. Div. 967, 51 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1st Dep't 1944).
• On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
See, e.g., Caplan v. Caplan 268 N.Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23 (1935); Allen v.
Allen, 246 N.Y. 571, 159 N.E. 656 (1927) (mene. opinion); Perlman v. Brook-
lyn City R.R., 117 Misc. 353, 191 N.Y. Supp. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1Q21), aff'd mein.,
202 App. Div. 822, 194 N.Y. Supp. 971 (2d Dep't 1922).
2 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
19571
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sidered one identity and thus the spouse was exempt from liabilityPs
In 1937, New York, by an amendment to Section 57 of the Domestic
Relations Law, recognized the right of one spouse to maintain a per-
sonal injury action against the other.4 The Legislature, by Section
167(3) of the Insurance Law, also provided: "No policy or contract
shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because
of death of or injuries to his or her spouse . . . unless express pro-
vision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy." "  The
purpose of this provision was to protect the insurance company from
possible fraud and collusion in suits against one spouse by the other.6
Case law extended the application of Section 167(3) of the Insurance
Law to suits between spouses who married subsequent to the tort,
since the opportunity for collusion remained the same. 7
Still unsolved was the construction of Section 167(3) as applied
to torts occurring in other jurisdictions. In Lamb v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company,8 the New York Supreme Court held that the
statute was applicable where the accident occurred in other jurisdic-
tions provided that the policy was "issued or delivered in this state," 9
since the statute becomes part of all New York policies. 10 However,
the Connecticut court in Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Insurance- Company" construed Section 167(3) as applying only to
accidents occurring in New York. The court reasoned that since the
statute was enacted in connection with Section 57 of the Domestic
Relations Law, it should be construed as a limitation only upon the
right created by that section. 12 The court determined that any other
construction would enlarge upon the protection afforded insurers, a
protection not contemplated by the Legislature."3 It should be noted
that Connecticut is bound to the interpretation New York places upon
its statutes,' 4 but the Lamb case had not been brought to the court's
3 Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 255-56, 164 N.E. 42, 43(1928) (dictum); Abbe v. Abbe, 22 App. Div. 483, 484-85, 48 N.Y. Supp.
25, 26 (Zd Dep't 1897) (dictum).
4 Laws of New York 1937, c. 669.
5 Laws of New York 1937, c. 669, as amended, Laws of New York 1945,
c. 409.
6 See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Morgan, 33 F. Supp. 190(W.D.N.Y. 1940); Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 258 App.
Div. 603, 17 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1940).
7 Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., supra note 6.
8 105 N.Y.L.J. 894, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1941), aff'd mere., 263 App.
Div. 859, 32 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't 1942).
9 N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(1).10 See Lamb v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 N.Y.L.J. 894, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
Feb. 27, 1941), aff'd inem., 263 App. Div. 859, 32 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't
1942).
11 142 Conn. 573, 116 A.2d 169 (1955).
12 Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 Conn. 573, 116 A.2d
169 (1955).
13 See Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., supra note 12.
14 See Daury v. Ferraro, 108 Conn. 386, 143 Atl. 630 (1928).
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attention, so it appeared that there was no New York court construc-
tion of the statute.' 5
General Accident Life & Fire Assurance Corporation v. Ganser,16
its facts similar to those of the instant case, relied upon 'the construc-
tion .given Section 167(3) by the prior Lamb decision. The court
decided that since the action was based on a contract, it should be
interpreted by the laws of the jurisdiction where it is writtenY'
Furthermore, it stated that because "the contract is ambulatory
and contemplates performance within many jurisdictions,"' s the
rule of lex loci contractus must be applied. Moreover, the court
concluded that neither the purpose nor the wording of the section
required a construction limiting its application to accidents within the
jurisdiction. 19
The appellate division in the instant case rejected the reasoning
of the Willianson case by a three-twvo decision, and held that Section
167(3) was applicable to New York policies of insurance even though
the accident occurred in a different jurisdiction.20 In words parallel-
ing the Ganser case, the Court decided that the contract should be
construed according to the place of issue.21 The Court looked to the
statute in determining the intent, and concluded that the words, being
clear and unequivocal, left nothing to be implied.22
The argument can be made that Section 57 was enacted to permit
suits between spouses in New York courts. Since Section 167(3)
was enacted with Section 57, it should therefore apply only to suits
between spouses brought in New York courts.23 It is submitted,
however, that if the Legislature intended such a limitation, it would
have expressed it.
Sound reasoning compels that a contract of insurance be cori-
strued by the laws where the contract was made,24 and not the law
where the contract is performed, since the latter would subject the
agreement to many varied constructions. Added certainty results
in that contracting parties are better able to determine the extent and
15 General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, 2 Misc. 2d 18, 25,
150 N.Y.S2d 705, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (dictum).
16 2 Misc. 2d 18, 150 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
17 See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, supra note 15, at 22,
150 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
's Id. at 21-22, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
10 See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, 2 Misc. 2d 18,
150 N.Y.S2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1956).20 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 1 A.D2d 629, 152 N.Y.S.2d
879 (1st Dep't 1956).21 Id. at 631, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
22 See note 29 supra.
23 See Fagan,-Insurance, 1956 Survey of N.Y. Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1436,
1442 (1956).24 See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, 2 Misc. 2d 18,
150 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1956); accord,, Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial
Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935).
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limits of their own contract. The evil sought to be prevented, that
of fraud and collusion, by Section 167(3) of the Insurance Law is
equally present whether or not the accident occurs in other juris-
dictions.25  The Court of Appeals has stated: "It is not allowable,
to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and when the words
have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of
conjecture, in order to restrict or extend the meaning." 26
)X
PROPERTY- CONDEMNATION -COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOY-
MENT.-Plaintiff-lessee brought an action for breach of covenant of
quiet enjoyment. The lease contained a provision that, in the event
of condemnation, the term would end and the lessee would not par-
ticipate in the award. Prior to the execution of the lease, defendant-
lessor had some inconclusive negotiations with the City of New York
looking to a sale of the property. Subsequent to the execution of the
lease, the defendant-lessor gave the City an option to purchase any
award resulting from condemnation proceedings. Thereafter, the
property was condemned and the City exercised its option. Plaintiff
alleged that the defendant's co-operation in giving the option consti-
tuted a breach of covenant. The Court of Appeals held that the de-
fendant's action did not constitute interference with the plaintiff's
possessory rights, and that the eviction was the direct result of the
sovereign's exercise of the right of eminent domain. Dolnan v.
United States Trust Co., 2 N.Y.2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 784 (1956).
A grantee of leased real property acquires title subject to the
lease, and the possessory rights of the lessee are not divested by a
sale to the City or a private individual.' The landlord has the duty
to protect the tenant's possessory rights, and any interference by the
landlord resulting in an actual or constructive eviction is a breach of
covenant of quiet enjoyment.2  However, when a tenant is evicted by
the sovereign's exercise of its power of eminent domain, no action
arises against the landlord.3 Protection is afforded to the landlord
25 General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, 2 Misc. 2d 18, 23,
150 N.Y.S.2d 705, 710 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (dictum).
26 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. *593, *601 (1854), cited with approval
in Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 525, 99 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1951)
(per curiam).
I N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 223.
2 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 9 Ave.-31 St. Corp., 274 N.Y. 388, 9 N.E.2d
20 (1937); Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 178 App. Div. 19, 165 N.Y.
Supp. 122 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917); Times Square
Improvement Co. v. Fleischmann's Vienna Model Bakery Co., 173 App. Div.
633, 160 N.Y. Supp. 346 (1st Dep't 1916).
a N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § B15-37.0; Gallup v. Albany R. Co., 7 Lans. 471
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